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COMMENTS
EXTENDED BORDER SEARCHES AND PROBABLE CAUSE
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the warrantless stop and
search of his automobile, without probable cause or consent, by a rov-
ing border patrol of the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service.' The search, conducted twenty-five air miles north of the
Mexican border2 ostensibly for the purpose of locating illegally im-
ported aliens, disclosed a large quantity of marijuana3 which was used
I. The Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts three types of surveil-
lance along inland roadways for the purpose of detecting the illegal importation of ali-
ens: (1) permanent checkpoints, (2) temporary checkpoints, and (3) roving patrols.
Permanent sites are usually located at a point beyond the convergence of several roads
leading from the border. To avoid repeated checking of commuter and suburban traf-
fic, the sites are removed from urban areas. Of the 13 sites in the Mexican border
area, all but one are located more than 25, but less than 100, air miles from the bor-
der. Temporary sites are usually located on less heavily travelled roads if safety
standards can be observed and if the terrain permits some element of surprise. Roving
patrols generally operate on lightly travelled roads and stop vehicles on a random
basis. In all three types of surveillance, officers conduct a limited inspection which
includes inspecting trunks of some of the vehicles stopped, either at random or on the
basis of suspicion. Brief for the United States at 23-25, Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
The Government asserted that authority for all three types of surveillance is found
in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1973). Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973). See notes 6 & 7 infra.
2. The stop and search occurred on California State Highway 78, at a point ap-
proximately fifty road miles north of the border. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez,
452 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1971). The road is an east-west highway running partly
through an undeveloped region, but nowhere reaching the Mexican border. 413 U.S.
at 267-68.
3. The officers, having received information that aliens sometimes concealed
themselves behind the rear seat of an automobile with their legs doubled up under the
cushion, looked under the rear seat and discovered packages which they believed to
contain marijuana. A search of other parts of the vehicle revealed many other pack-
ages of marijuana. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir.
1971). The Government did not contend that there was probable cause of any kind
to initiate the search, but relied solely on the authority contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1357
(a) (1970). 413 U.S. at 268.
The vehicle search authority of immigration officers is limited to searching for ali-
ens. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1970). Officers may search any part of the vehicle large
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to convict petitioner of a federal crime.4 Affirming the conviction,0
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the search to be valid under
a federal statute" and regulation.' The Supreme Court reversed and
held: The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile, without prob-
able cause or consent, violated petitioner's fourth amendment rights.8
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
enough to conceal aliens. United States v. Lujan-Romero, 469 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.
1972); Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States, 425 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1970); Roa-Rodri-
quez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969). Only customs agents are em-
powered to search vehicles for illegally imported contraband. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
However, all immigration officers have been designated as acting customs agents by
a series of delegations of authority held proper in United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d
1359 (5th Cir. 1973). For cases upholding the right of immigration officers to act
simultaneously as customs agents, see United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129' (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. Bird, 456 F.2d 1023
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. Maggard, 451 F.2d
502 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972).
4. Petitioner was convicted of knowingly receiving, concealing, and facilitating the
transportation of illegally imported marijuana. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, tit. I,
§ 106, 70 Stat. 570.
5. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1970) provides:
(a) Any officer or employee of the service authorized under regulations pre-
scribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant ... (3)
within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,
to board and search for aliens any . . . vehicle . . . for the purpose of pa-
trolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.
A similar provision was first enacted in 1946. Act of Aug. 7, 1946, ch. 768, 60 Stat.
865. The legislative history of this statute is sparse. It appears that the statute was
enacted in response to a request from the Attorney General for such authority in order
to effectively enforce the immigration laws. H.R. RP. No. 186, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946). The provision was subsequently incorporated into § 287(a) (3) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3) (1970).
7. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1973) provides:
Reasonable distance. The term 'reasonable distance' as used in . . . the Act
[8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970)] means within 100 air miles from any exter-
nal boundary of the United States ....
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1970), the Attorney General is authorized to prescribe reg-
ulations he deems necessary for enforcement of the immigration laws.
If 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3) (1970) were interpreted as blanket authority to search ve-
hicles for aliens without cause, an interpretation given to it by the four dissenting Jus-
tices in Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 291, a substantial proportion of persons living
in the United States, including most inhabitants of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
New York, would be subject to such searches under the statute and regulation.
8. Petitioner's motion to suppress the introduction of the marijuana as evidence
was improperly denied. Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may
not be used at trial. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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zuresY Generally, a search of private property is unreasonable unless
it has been authorized by a valid search warrant ° issued by a neutral
magistrate1 upon probable cause to believe that the item specified will
be found in the place to be searched.1 2  There are, however, a number
of carefully defined exceptions to the necessity for a warrant and the
requirement of probable cause in the traditional sense.13  Customs
9. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
10. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
11. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); Giordeneflo v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
12. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U.S. 528 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
13. Examples of areas in which something less than probable cause is required are
administrative inspections, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (implied con-
sent in a regulated business), and housing code inspections, Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967) (probable cause to believe that a particular area includes buildings
with code violations, not specific buildings). Some of the major exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant are auto searches, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971), exigent circumstances, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (warrantless stop
and frisk held valid where police officer reasonably believed his safety to be in dan-
ger), hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (pursuit of suspected armed
felon), and searches incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (and cases cited therein).
For a general discussion of these and other exceptions, see 68 Am. Jun. 2d Searches
and Seizures §§ 37-59 (1973).
The Court rejected the Government's contention that the search of petitioner's auto-
mobile was constitutional under the auto search and administrative inspection excep-
tions. 413 U.S. at 269-72. Search of an automobile without a warrant has been held
not to violate the fourth amendment where: (1) the officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the auto contains contraband; and (2) the vehicle is readily movable so that
it is not reasonably practicable to secure a search warrant. Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). The Court in Almeida-Sanchez held that the existence of a movable
automobile may dispense with the necessity for a warrant, but probable cause is still
required. See generally Aitken & Murray, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile
Searches, 3 LOYOLA U.L. REv. (L.A.) 95 (1970); Note, Automobile Searches and the
Fourth Amendment, 47 Czu.-KENT L. Rnv. 232 (1970).
The Supreme Court has upheld housing code inspections made without probable cause
to believe that a particular building is the site of a specific violation. The inspector,
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and immigration inspections pursuant to a border crossing, commonly
known as border searches, constitute one such exception.' 4 The fourth
amendment, as applied to border searches, requires only that the search
in question be reasonable. 15 Courts have agreed that routine searches
however, must obtain a warrant supported by particular physical and demographic char-
acteristics of the general area in which the building to be inspected is located. Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
The Court has also sanctioned warrantless inspections of traditionally regulated busi-
nesses, without probable cause, where Congress has authorized such inspections. United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (sale of firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (manufacture and sale of liquor). The Court in
Almeida-Sanchez found Camara and See to be inapplicable because they required war-
rants in order to circumscribe the discretion of the inspector in the field. 413 U.S.
at 270. The search of petitioner's automobile in Almeida-Sanchez was conducted in
the unfettered discretion of border patrol officers. Biswell and Colonnade were also
held inapposite because the businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to
the restrictions placed upon him. There was no basis for a finding of implied consent
on the part of petitioner. Id. at 271.
14. Border searches are not governed by the warrant and probable cause provisions
of the fourth amendment. United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Valadez v. United States, 358 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966);
Taylor v. United States, 352 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1965); Mansfield v. United States, 308
F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962). The rationale for this exception is set forth in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925):
Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary, because
of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which
may be lawfully brought in.
See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886):
As this act [the first statute authorizing customs inspections at the border,
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 43] was passed by the same Congress
'which proposed for adoption the original Amendments to the Constitution, it
is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of
this kind as "unreasonable," and they are not embraced within the prohibition
of the Amendment.
See generally Note, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth Amendment, 10
AIz. L. REV. 457 (1968); Note, Search and Seizure at the Border-the Border Search,
21 RUTGERs L. Rnv. 513 (1967); Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment,
77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968).
15. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886); United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973); United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1970); Walker v. United
States, 404 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187 (5th
Cir. 1967); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Alexander v. United
States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); Marsh v. United
States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965); King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959). These cases deal primarily with the ques-
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conducted at the border itself are reasonable per se.' 6 A more difficult
problem has been determining when a search conducted away from the
border should qualify as an extended border search and thus be sanc-
tioned under relaxed fourth amendment standards.17
tion of when it is reasonable to initiate a search. However, in addition to that re-
quirement, the scope of the search must also be reasonable. See Henderson v. United
States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967) ("clear indication" of smuggling required for
search of body cavity).
16. United States v. Halprin, 450 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 994 (1972); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1121 (1969), Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 977 (1966); Mansfield v. United States, 308 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962); Murgia
v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); Landau v. United States Att'y, 82 F.2d
285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970), which governs immigration searches, requires
no suspicion of any kind on the part of the searching official. See note 6 supra. 8
C.FR. § 287.1(a)(2) (1973) fixes the geographic limits of this authority as within
100 air miles of any external boundary. See note 7 supra. Thus, some cases seem
to have held that routine searches for immigrants at any point within 100 air miles from
a border are reasonable per se. United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir.
1973); Mienke v. United States, 452 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971); Duprez v. United
States, 435 F.2d 1276, 1277 (9th Cir. 1970); Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d
1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Avey, 428 F.2d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970); United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283, 284 (9th
Cir. 1970); Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963). But cf. United
States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 821. (1973) (mere
presence within 100 miles of border does not, without more, justify all searches
by immigration officers); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973) (once national frontier has been crossed, search in
question must be reasonable upon all of its facts, only one of which is proximity to
border); United States v. DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972) (search must be rea-
sonable under circumstances of particular case); United States v. Maggard, 451 F.2d
502 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972) (searching officer must have
reasonable suspicion).
The law of customs searches at points removed from the border is also somewhat
unclear. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970) authorizes customs agents to search vehicles for con-
traband if "they shall suspect" that the customs laws are being violated. Although
no precise geographic limitations have been defined for customs searches, it has been
held that the nation's borders are expandable for that purpose. United States v. Hill,
430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1970); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967).
Many cases have held that a search made away from the border need only be rea-
sonable under the circumstances in order to qualify as an extended border search.
United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1970); Thomas v. United States, 372
F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); King
v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959).
Courts have not always agreed, however, on what is reasonable. See United States v.
Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971) (officer must
be reasonably certain that vehicle is being used for illegal importation of contraband);
United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969)
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In holding that the search of petitioner's automobile violated the
fourth amendment, the Court in Almeida-Sanchez rejected the Govern-
ment's contention that the search was constitutional as a statutory ex-
tension of the border search doctrine.' 8 The Court considered both
the interests asserted by the Government to justify the official intrusion,
and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. While recog-
nizing the Government's interest in combatting illegal immigration'
and the difficulty involved in policing our national boundaries, 20 the
Court observed that those lawfully within the country have a right to
free passage, without interruption, unless there is probable cause to be-
lieve that they are committing an illegal act.2 ' The Court did not ques-
tion the constitutionality of routine inspections of individuals or con-
veyances seeking to cross national borders. But the search of petition-
er's automobile, when there was no reason to believe that petitioner
had even crossed the border, much less that he was guilty of any of-
fense, violated the constitutional rights of one lawfully within the coun-
(when individual has direct contact with border area, or his movements are reasonably
related to it, he is member of class of persons whom suspicious customs officer may
stop and search while individual is still in border area); Alexander v. United States,
362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966) (officer must be reason-
ably certain that contraband was aboard vehicle at time of entry into United States).
See also 8 SAN Dmo L. REv. 435 (1971).
18. 413 U.S. at 272-73. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3) (1970) represents Congress' view
of the procedures necessary to pursue its policy of immigration control. Brief for the
United States at 21.
The Court reached the constitutional question without considering an alternative
construction of the statute that would have avoided it. For the view that the statute
merely grants authority to be exercised in accordance with the traditional constitu-
tional limitation of probable cause, see United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d
459, 461 (9th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
19. The Government has the power to exclude aliens. Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Sovereignty carries with it an inherent right to protect
territorial integrity against the intrusion of unauthorized persons or things. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d
379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966); Fernandez v. United States, 321
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 950 (1961).
20. See United States v. Glaziou, 452 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1121 (1969); Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967); King v. United
States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965).
21. 413 U.S. at 274-75. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See
also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (stop and search of vehicle on
open highway is major interference with lives of occupants).
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try.-2  The Court concluded that the broad search authority embodied
in the statute21 can be justified only in searches at the border itself
or its functional equivalent.24  Only in these instances is there reason-
able assurance that there has in fact been a border crossing, thus mak-
ing it reasonable to subject persons to searches under relaxed fourth
amendment standards. As to roving immigration searches removed
from the border, probable cause is required.25
The full impact of the Court's ruling is not clear. One immediate
effect is to impose a probable cause standard for immigration searches
which is at least as stringent as the reasonable suspicion standard re-
quired for customs searches. 26 Thus the decision should curb the prac-
tice of conducting customs searches on grounds disclosed during the
course of an immigration search initiated under circumstances which
would not initially have warranted a customs search. This practice,
employed in Almeida-Sanche 27 as well as other cases, 8 had the effect
of rendering the reasonable suspicion requirement of the customs stat-
ute meaningless where both customs and immigration search powers
were vested in the same officer. 9
22. Lower courts have deferred to Congress' judgment, as manifested in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a) (3) (1970), that broad search authority is necessary to effectively police our
borders. Se, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963). The
Supreme Court, however, expressing high regard for fourth amendment safeguards,
found such a degree of deference unwarranted. 413 U.S. at 273.
23. 8 U,S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970). See note 6 supra.
24. Examples of a functional equivalent are: (1) an established checkpoint near the
border at the confluence of two or more roads extending from the border; and (2)
a search of passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a United States airport
after a non-stop international flight. 413 U.S. at 272-73.
25. Since the search falls within the auto search exception, no warrant is required.
See note 14 supra.
Justice Powell, concurring, proposed an alternative procedure which would not dis-
pense with the warrant requirement. He would require an "area warrant"--limited in
both time and area-issued on the basis of probable cause to believe that there is a
high incidence of illegal immigration in a particular area, rather than specific knowl-
edge about a particular automobile. 413 U.S. at 275 (Powell, I., concurring). The
Justices joining the majority opinion were divided on the question of the constitution-
ality of this type of area warrant. Id. at 270 n.3.
26. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970) with 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970). See
note 17 supra.
27. See note 3 supra.
28. United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972); Mienke v. United States, 452 F.2d 1076 (9th
Cir. 1971); Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1970); Fumagalli v.
United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Avey, 428 F.2d 1159
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Whether the Court will extend the Almeida-Sanchez requirement of
probable cause to customs searches3" conducted away from the border,
and immigration searches31 at checkpoints not located at the border
itself or a functional equivalent, remains to be seen. Justice Powell,
in his concurrence, 32 viewed the decision as applicable only to roving
immigration searches. The opinion of the Court, however, is open
to broader interpretation.
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970); United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283
(9th Cir. 1970); Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969); Fer-
nandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Winer, 294
F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
29. See note 3 supra.
30. See note 17 supra (customs searches).
31. See note 1 supra (immigration searches).
32. 413 U.S. at 275.
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